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LET’S NOT FORGET: WE HAVE A STATE INTEREST TO 
PROMOTE 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
Osterweil v. Bartlett1 
(decided October 15, 2013) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The State of New York no longer requires a part-time resident 
to be domiciled in the State to obtain a handgun permit.2  The Court 
of Appeals in Osterweil v. Bartlett held that a person with a part-time 
residence in the State of New York was eligible for a handgun per-
mit.3  The court eliminated the domicile requirement of New York 
Penal Law § 400.00(3)4 that had previously been enforced by the 
State and the courts for decades.5  In interpreting the statute without a 
domicile requirement, the court showed a lack of cautiousness and 
 
1 999 N.E.2d 516 (N.Y. 2013). 
2 Id. at 519-20. 
3 Id. 
4 N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(3) states that: 
Applications shall be made and renewed, in the case of a license to carry 
or possess a pistol or revolver, to the licensing officer in the city or coun-
ty, as the case may be, where the applicant resides, is principally em-
ployed . . . .  An application shall state the full name, date of birth, resi-
dence, present occupation of each person or individual signing the same, 
whether or not he or she is a citizen of the United States, whether or not 
he or she complies with each requirement for eligibility specified in sub-
division one of this section and such other facts as may be required to 
show the good character, competency and integrity of each person or in-
dividual signing the application.  An application shall be signed and veri-
fied by the applicant.  Each individual signing an application shall sub-
mit one photograph of himself or herself and a duplicate for each 
required copy of the application.  Such photographs shall have been tak-
en within thirty days prior to filing the application. 
N.Y. PENAL LAW  § 400.00(3) (McKinney 2013) (emphasis added). 
5 Osterweil, 999 N.E.2d at 519. 
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rendered a flawed decision. 
The decision’s flaws lie in the court’s failure to define a “part-
time residency,” and to set a minimum threshold for a part-time resi-
dent to establish a connection with the State of New York.  The court, 
consistent with the State’s interest in regulating firearms, could have 
defined a part-time residence and laid out a framework to interpret 
the residency provision of New York Penal Law § 400.00(3),6 but it 
forfeited the opportunity to do so. 
The court should have taken the opportunity to establish a res-
idency requirement standard in New York Penal Law § 400.00.  The 
residency standard used by the New York Department of Taxation 
and Finance that applies to nonresidents and part-year residents for 
taxation purposes may have been an option for the court.7  The court 
could have adopted this standard or a variation of it in order to pro-
mote the State’s interest in gun control. 
This Case Note will demonstrate why the ruling by the New 
York Court of Appeals in Osterweil was contrary to the State’s inter-
est in strict gun regulation.  This Note will also explore why the court 
did not establish a comprehensive standard for determining whether a 
part-time resident is eligible to obtain a handgun permit in New York.  
Furthermore, the important role District of Columbia v. Heller8 and 
McDonald v. City of Chicago9 played in this decision will be exam-
ined.  The decisions of these two monumental Second Amendment 
cases played a major role in compelling the State of New York to 
change its historic interpretation of a domicile requirement in New 
York Penal Law § 400.00. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Osterweil was once a domiciliary of the State of New York, 
but then moved to another state and maintained his New York home 
as a vacation property.10  As a resident of Summit, New York, he ap-
plied for a pistol/revolver license pursuant to New York Penal Law § 
 
6 See supra note 4. 
7 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 105.20 (2009). 
8 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding that the right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right 
that may require a high level of constitutional scrutiny when a person is deprived of the 
right). 
9 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (holding that the Second Amendment applies to the States). 
10 Osterweil, 999 N.E.2d at 516. 
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400.00.11  In the midst of Schoharie County Sheriff’s background in-
vestigation, Osterweil informed the Sheriff of his purchase of a home 
in Louisiana, which he intended to make his primary residence,12 and 
his plan to retain his Schoharie County home as a vacation property.13  
Osterweil then inquired as to whether he would still be eligible for a 
handgun license.14 
The Sheriff submitted Osterweil’s application to the Schohar-
ie County Court Judge, George R. Bartlett, III, and the county’s li-
censing officer.15  Along with the application, Osterweil also submit-
ted an affidavit to the County Judge, stating he and his wife 
continued to play a role in the community, both socially and political-
ly.16  Moreover, Osterweil cited District of Columbia v. Heller, in 
which the Supreme Court of the United States struck down a District 
of Columbia ban on handguns in the home.17 
In May 2009, Judge Bartlett denied Osterweil’s application, 
citing Penal Law § 400.00(3)(a) and Mahoney v. Lewis18 to establish 
that “residence” in § 400.00(3)(a) was meant to convey domicile.19  
Osterweil then brought suit in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of New York against Judge Bartlett, citing viola-
tions of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms and the 
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, arguing against the 
judge’s interpretation of Penal Law § 400.00(3)(a).20 
In the federal case, Osterweil mentioned additional facts that 
played a role in prolonging the process of his background investiga-
 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Osterweil, 999 N.E.2d at 517. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 636). 
18 605 N.Y.S.2d 168, 168 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1993). The court stated: 
While Penal Law § 400.00 does not contain a residency requirement per 
se, it follows a fortiori from the Penal Law § 400.00(3) mandate that ap-
plications for the type of permit sought here be filed in the city or county 
of residence that residency is indeed a prerequisite to its issuance.  
Moreover, based upon well-established rules of construction, we con-
clude that as used in this statute the term residence is equivalent to dom-
icile and requires something more than mere ownership of land. 
Id. 
19 Osterweil , 999 N.E.2d at 517. 
20 Id. 
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tion and the resultant denial of his handgun permit.21  Before the suit 
was filed, Judge Bartlett gave Osterweil an opportunity to provide 
precedent supporting his position on the residency requirement.22 
In a letter, Osterweil informed Judge Bartlett about “special 
steps” that could have been taken by the Sheriff regarding worn fin-
gerprints, but none of those “special steps” were, in fact, used.23  Fol-
lowing this dialogue, both parties exchanged several letters until the 
judge denied Osterweil’s application.24  In denying the application, 
Judge Bartlett rejected Osterweil’s argument that the application 
should be granted because the licensing process exceeded six 
months.25  Judge Bartlett insisted there was good cause for the de-
lay.26  Because the application was considered incomplete with re-
gard to the fingerprinting issue, Osterweil requested that the federal 
court only address the issue of the residency requirement.27 
Osterweil then appealed to the United States Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals, where the State of New York “oddly” insisted that 
New York Penal Law § 400.00(3)(a) did not require a resident to be a 
domiciliary in order to obtain a handgun permit in New York,28 de-
spite the State’s historical interpretation that this Section contained a 
domicile requirement.29  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals then 
certified the following question to the New York Court of Appeals: 
Is an applicant who owns a part-time residence in New 
York, but makes his permanent domicile elsewhere el-
igible for a New York handgun license in the city or 
county where his part-time residence is located?30 
 
21 Osterweil v. Bartlett, 819 F. Supp. 2d 72, 76 (N.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated, 738 F.3d 520 
(2d Cir. 2013). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. (“[Osterweil] informed defendant of special steps that could be taken with respect to 
persons with ‘worn’ fingerprints and further indicated that none of these ‘special steps’ were 
used by the Sheriff in his case.”). 
24 Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 76. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Osterweil v. Bartlett, 738 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2013).  The State changed its position on 
the domicile requirement once the case reached the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  The 
State relaxed its position on § 400.00(3)(a) because the interpretation of the domicile re-
quirement could have come into question, as a result of the Heller and McDonald rulings.  
See Gregory, infra note 70. 
29 See infra Section V. 
30 Osterweil, 738 F.3d at 521. 
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This question permitted the New York Court of Appeals to resolve 
whether the New York statute required domicile for a handgun per-
mit.31 
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Historically, New York Penal Law § 400.00(3)(a) was inter-
preted as barring a non-domiciliary from obtaining a handgun permit 
in New York.32  Osterweil challenged this interpretation in the United 
States District Court, Northern District of New York.33  A number of 
constitutional claims were brought against the State of New York in 
the federal suit.34  The all-encompassing claim was that the statute 
violated his Second Amendment right to bear arms.35  In addition, he 
asserted a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause claim be-
cause the statute discriminated against the class of non-domiciliaries 
of New York.36  Similarly, an Article IV Privileges and Immunities37 
claim was made because the statute discriminated against out-of-state 
domiciliaries who had a part-time residency in New York.38  Four-
teenth Amendment substantive and procedural Due Process claims 
were also brought because the Second Amendment right to keep and 
bear arms was applied to the states by the Supreme Court in McDon-
ald.39  Lastly, state law claims were brought referencing the New 
York State Constitution and New York Civil Rights Law.40 
The Second Amendment claim consisted of three causes of 
action.41  The first cause of action alleged that Osterweil was denied 
his right to bear arms “in violation of the Second Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, as made applicable to the states through 
 
31 Id. 
32 See Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining the statute’s residency 
standard); see also Gregory, infra note 70 (stating that the State changed its position and now 
part-time residents do not need to be domiciled to obtain a handgun permit). 
33 Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 74-75 (denying Osterweil’s motion for summary judg-
ment in its entirety). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 79. 
36 Id. at 86. 
37 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
38 Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 87. 
39 Id. at 88-89. 
40 Id. at 89. 
41 Id. at 79. 
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‘selective incorporation’ by the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .”42  Simi-
larly, the second cause of action alleged a violation of New York 
Civil Rights Law, which uses similar language to that of the Second 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.43  The third cause of 
action alleged that Judge Bartlett denied Osterweil his right to bear 
arms by applying a domicile definition and requirement as a prereq-
uisite to a firearms license.44  The district court denied Osterweil’s 
motion for summary judgment on this claim.45 
Osterweil argued that the district court should apply a strict 
scrutiny standard to evaluate his Second Amendment claim because 
there was a fundamental constitutional right at stake.46  The district 
court rejected this contention,47and “[d]rawing on First Amendment 
jurisprudence,” the court applied intermediate scrutiny to the Second 
Amendment—as other courts have done.48 
Osterweil’s motion for summary judgment regarding the 
Equal Protection Clause was also denied.49  The court reasoned that 
residents and nonresidents were not similarly situated with regard to 
the ability of the State to monitor a licensee’s eligibility for purposes 
of obtaining a firearms license.50  Therefore, there was no equal pro-
tection violation.51 
The court also rejected Osterweil’s Privileges and Immunities 
claim because “New York has a substantial interest in limiting fire-
arm possession to those with the most significant contacts with the 
State and . . . New York Penal Law § 400.00 [was] substantially re-
lated to that purpose.”52  Thus, there was no valid Privileges and Im-
munities claim.53 
 
42 Id. 
43 Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 79. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 86. 
46 Id. at 79. 
47 Id. at 84-85. 
48 Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 82 (stating that “fundamental constitutional rights are not 
invariably subject to strict scrutiny”).  The court drew similarities to First Amendment con-
tent-neutral restrictions, which are subject to intermediate scrutiny.  Id. (using United States 
v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), as an example of content neutral restrictions that are sub-
ject to intermediate scrutiny). 
49 Id. at 87. 
50 Id. at 86-87. 
51 Id. at 87. 
52 Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 88. 
53 Id. 
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With respect to the substantive due process claim, the district 
court found there were no “ ‘arbitrary,’ ‘conscience-shocking,’ or 
‘oppressive in a constitutional sense,’ ” actions by the New York 
Government.54  Judge Bartlett was only interpreting the law of the 
state with reasonable justification.55 
The procedural due process claim, which was based on the six 
month statutory requirement, also did not survive because “[a]t most 
any violation of state procedural requirements would create liability 
under state law.”56  There was no showing by Osterweil that he had a 
protected liberty or property interest of which he was deprived with-
out due process.57  However, an Article 78 proceeding could have 
been used to challenge the denial of his firearms permit denial under 
New York State law.58 
Finally, the state law claims were never even heard by the dis-
trict court.59  The court exercised its discretion and did not apply sup-
plemental jurisdiction.60  Thus, the New York State constitutional 
claim and the New York Civil Rights Law claim were both dismissed 
without prejudice.61 
The decision of the court was appealed to the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals.62  The Second Circuit certified the domicile ques-
tion of whether a part-time resident can obtain a handgun permit to 
the New York Court of Appeals.63  The Court of Appeals relied on 
the language of New York Penal Law § 400.00(7)64 and interpreted 
 
54 Id. (quoting Lowrance v. Achtyl, 20 F.3d 529, 537 (2d Cir.1994)). 
55 Id. (“[D]efendant’s conduct in denying plaintiff’s license application cannot be said to 
have been without any reasonable justification, as he was merely implementing the law as 
defined by the courts.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
56 Id. at 89 (citing Bolden v. Alston, 810 F.2d 353, 358 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
57 Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 89. 
58 Id. (implying that Osterweil did not file an Article 78 proceeding).  An Article 78 pro-
ceeding allows a plaintiff to appeal the decision of a state action in a proceeding.  N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. § 7801 (McKinney 1962). 
59 Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 89. 
60 Id. at 89-90. 
61 Id. at 90. 
62 Osterweil, 738 F.3d at 520 (certifying the domicile question for the New York Court of 
Appeals). 
63 Osterweil, 999 N.E.2d at 516 (declining to address the constitutional issue of domicile). 
64 N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(7) states that: 
Any license issued pursuant to this section shall . . . be approved as to 
form by the superintendent of state police.  A license to carry or possess 
a pistol or revolver shall have attached the licensee’s photograph, and a 
coupon which shall be removed and retained by any person disposing of 
7
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the statutory intent behind the definition of “resident.”65  The court 
noted that the question raised by Osterweil of whether the domicile 
requirement was constitutional did not need to be answered because 
of language in Penal Law § 400.00(7).66  Therefore, the statute was 
interpreted in a manner that excluded the domicile requirement for 
obtaining a handgun permit.67 
IV. MAKING SENSE OF THE COURT’S DECISION 
An understanding of why the Court of Appeals’ decision did 
not promote the State’s interest requires an analysis of the Osterweil 
matter.  The case dates back to the year 2008 when Osterweil first 
applied for his firearm permit.68  Osterweil’s permit was denied by 
the Schoharie County Court Judge and the federal district court—
both interpreting the residency provision of New York Penal Law § 
400.00—with a domicile requirement to obtain a firearms permit.69  
The Court of Appeals’ ruling in Osterweil implies that the court and 
the State had to take into account several concerns. 
The State and the courts wanted to avoid litigating the consti-
tutionality of New York Penal Law § 400(3)(a).70  New York Penal 
 
a firearm to the licensee.  Such license shall specify the weapon covered 
by calibre, make, model, manufacturer's name and serial number, or if 
none, by any other distinguishing number or identification mark, and 
shall indicate whether issued to carry on the person or possess on the 
premises, and if on the premises shall also specify the place where the li-
censee shall possess the same.  If such license is issued to an alien, or to 
a person not a citizen of and usually a resident in the state, the licensing 
officer shall state in the license the particular reason for the issuance and 
the names of the persons certifying to the good character of the appli-
cant. 
N.Y. PENAL LAW 400.00(7) (emphasis added). 
65 Osterweil, 999 N.E.2d at 519-20. 
66 Id. at 520. 
67 Id. at 519-20. 
68 Id. at 516. 
69 Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 89. 
70 See Osterweil, 999 N.E.2d at 520.  Since there is no domicile requirement, the constitu-
tionality of the statute did not have to be analyzed.  Id.  The National Rifle Association was 
pleased with the victory in Osterweil, but the constitutional question concerning the domicile 
requirement was never answered.  Mr. Daniel L. Schmutter of Greenbaum, Rowe, Smith & 
Davis of Woodbridge, New Jersey, attorney for Mr. Osterweil, discussed why the constitu-
tionality of the statute was never litigated in the United States Law Week: 
[W]hen we got to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, [counsel 
for the State of New York] started to soften their position, they took sort 
of an intermediate position, they basically said, ‘Well, it looks like this 
8
Touro Law Review, Vol. 31 [2015], No. 4, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/5
2015 WE HAVE A STATE INTEREST TO PROMOTE 711 
Law § 400(3)(a) provides that: 
[A]pplications shall be made and renewed, in the case 
of a license to carry or possess a pistol or revolver, to 
the licensing officer in the city or county, as the case 
may be, where the applicant resides, is principally 
employed or has his principal place of business as 
merchant or storekeeper.71 
The court only bound itself to interpret what the firearm licensing 
statute meant by “resides.”72  In only defining “resides,” the court 
avoided determining whether the State’s longstanding practice of in-
terpreting a domicile requirement was unconstitutional.73  The court 
avoided the issue of domicile because the statute would then be in di-
rect violation of the Heller and McDonald rulings.74 
The recent rulings in District of Columbia v. Heller75 and 
McDonald v. City of Chicago76 played a major role in the court’s de-
cision.77  The court seemed obliged to hold that a person who was a 
part-time resident has the right to possess a handgun in New York 
because a contrary holding would have required litigation of a consti-
tutional issue.78  If the court had adhered to its domicile requirement 
interpretation from previous cases, the constitutionality of a domicile 
 
interpretation of this law could be in question as a result of the Supreme 
Court’s Second Amendment rulings in Heller and McDonald[.]’ 
Patrick L. Gregory, Part-time Residency is Sufficient to Obtain Handgun License in New 
York, U.S. LAW WEEKLY, Jan. 7, 2014. 
71 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(3)(a) (emphasis added). 
72 Osterweil, 999 N.E.2d at 518. 
73 Id. at 520. 
74 See Gregory, supra note 70 (explaining that the statute is in direct violation of the Sec-
ond Amendment and the Heller and McDonald decisions). 
75 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  In Heller, the District of Columbia enacted a statute that prohibit-
ed the possession of handguns within the home.  Id. at 574-75.  The statute also required res-
idents who lawfully owned firearms to keep their long guns unloaded and disassembled, or 
with a trigger lock in their homes.  Id. at 575.  Heller, a resident of the District of Columbia, 
applied for a handgun he intended to keep at his home; however, the District refused his ap-
plication.  Id.  The Court held that the Second Amendment safeguards an individual’s right 
to possess a firearm and use it for lawful purposes for self-defense in the home.  Id. at 636.  
Therefore, the Court found that the right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right, and 
deprivation of such right may require a high level of constitutional scrutiny. 
76 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (holding that the Second Amendment applies to the States).  Chi-
cago and Oak Park banned the possession of handguns by private residents.  Id. at 750.  
McDonald and others sued to have these laws declared unconstitutional as they were fearful 
of becoming the targets of violence from drug dealers in the city.  Id. at 751. 
77 Osterweil, 999 N.E.2d at 517. 
78 Id. at 520. 
9
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requirement for a handgun permit might have been challenged in the 
Supreme Court of the United States.79 
To safeguard the constitutionality of New York Penal Law § 
400.00(3)(a), the New York Court of Appeals cited § 400.00(7) of the 
statute which states: 
If such license is issued to an alien, or to a person not 
a citizen of and usually a resident in the state, the li-
censing officer shall state in the license the particular 
reason for the issuance and the names of the persons 
certifying to the good character of the applicant.80 
As reasoned by the court, § 400.00(7) allows a jurisdiction to issue a 
handgun permit to a person who is not “usually a resident in the 
state.”81  Therefore, the statute avoided constitutional scrutiny be-
cause the State of New York and the Court of Appeals changed their 
position on the domicile requirement,82 carelessly disregarding the 
State’s interest. 
V. IDENTIFYING THE STATE INTEREST 
Over the past 100 years, the State of New York has expressed 
its concerns about gun control.83  The State’s interest in regulating 
firearms dates to the inception of New York Penal Law § 400.00—
the benchmark for all other gun control legislation throughout the na-
tion.84  Most notably, the State has had its share of governors in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries from both sides of the aisle who 
 
79 See Gregory, supra note 70 (stating that a contrary ruling may have put in question the 
constitutionality of New York Penal Law § 400.00(3)(a)). 
80 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(7). 
81 Osterweil, 999 N.E.2d at 520-21. 
82 See Gregory, supra note 70. 
83 See Peter Duffy, 100 Years Ago, The Shot that Spurred New York’s Gun-Control Law, 
CITY ROOM (Jan. 23, 2011, 11:00 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/100-
years-ago-the-shot-that-spurred-new-yorks-gun-control-law/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 
(discussing how New York Penal Law § 400.00 came about); Bar Hidden Weapons on Sulli-
van’s Plea, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1911, at 3 (discussing how Senator Tim Sullivan was able 
to gain support for the gun control law); Richard Perez-Pena, Pataki Signs Nation’s Strictest 
Gun Controls, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/10/ny     re-
gion/pataki-signs-nation-s-strictest-gun-controls.html (illustrating a Republican Governor 
signing a strict gun control law); Shushannah Walshe, New York Passes Nation’s Toughest 
Gun Control Law, ABC NEWS (Jan. 15, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/york-state-
passes-toughest-gun-control-law-nation/story?id=18224091 (reporting on Governor Cuo-
mo’s enactment of the New York Safe Act). 
84 Duffy, supra note 83. 
10
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have supported the State’s interest in highly regulating firearms.85 
 
The Sullivan Law, now known as New York Penal Law § 
400.00, was enacted over 100 years ago.86  The law was a response to 
the “brazen murder” of a novelist that had occurred near a park.87  
Then New York State Senator, Tim Sullivan, who already had inten-
tions of placing restrictions on firearms, took an interest in the situa-
tion.88  The Sullivan Bill had very little opposition and was enacted 
on August 31, 1911.89  At the time, the Sullivan Law required indi-
viduals to obtain police issued licenses for concealable firearms.90  
Furthermore, the law made it a felony to carry an unlicensed con-
cealed weapon.91 
Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt played a role in the evolution 
of New York Penal Law § 400.00.92  Governor Roosevelt expressed 
his concern to the Legislature about the issuance of permits and stat-
ed, “[i]t is a fact that the present issuing of revolver permits by judges 
anywhere in the State is working badly, and permits must be more 
carefully guarded.”93  Governor Roosevelt’s statement is evidence 
that gun control measures were taken by the New York Legislature in 
the 1930s. 
High-profile New York governors have signed into law legis-
lation that at the time was said to be the strictest in the nation.94  In 
1980, Governor Hugh Carey signed a law that imposed a one-year 
prison sentence for anyone carrying an unlicensed handgun.95  This 
law was enacted after United States Representative for New York, 
Allard K. Lowenstein, was killed by a handgun, and four policemen 
 
85 See infra note 94. 
86 Duffy, supra note 83. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Duffy, supra note 83. 
92 See Osterweil, 999 N.E.2d at 519 (illustrating Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt’s role in 
shaping New York Penal Law § 400.00). 
93 Id. 
94 See Ward Morehouse III, New York Has Tough Gun Law, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 
(June 19, 1980), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/1980/0619/061943.html (showing 
that Governor Carey signed the law in response to gun violence that was taking place); Pe-
rez-Pena, supra note 83 (stating that Governor Pataki is one of the many New York gover-
nors to sign a strict gun law); Walshe, supra note 83 (discussing Governor Andrew Cuomo’s 
signing of the New York Safe Act). 
95 Morehouse III, supra note 94. 
11
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were shot to death earlier that year.96  Governor Pataki, a Republican, 
was also touted as having signed the “strictest” gun laws in the na-
tion.97  This enactment was particularly symbolic because Governor 
Pataki signed the law at the location of  the fatal shooting of six peo-
ple riding on a Long Island Rail Train seven years earlier.98 
Most recently, the State of New York passed the Nation’s 
toughest gun control law.99  On January 15, 2013, Governor Andrew 
Cuomo signed the New York Safe Act.100  The Act was partly in re-
action to the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting in Connecticut 
one month prior to its enactment.101  Pursuant to this legislation, as-
sault weapons have been broadly defined; magazine capacity has 
been limited to seven bullets; background checks for ammunition and 
gun buyers are required in private sales; and a one-state check on all 
firearm purchases was imposed.102  The enactment of such rigorous 
legislation indicates the State’s seriousness about gun control. 
The New York Safe Act and prior gun control measures illus-
trate the State of New York’s commitment to strict gun control—and 
concern with “persons of unsavory reputation” obtaining pistol per-
mits.103  Throughout the past 100 years, the actions of high-profile 
New York politicians have promoted strict gun control laws.104  By 
neglecting to establish a residency standard for part-time resident 
firearm permit applicants, the Court of Appeals did not promote and 
enforce the State’s clear interest in gun control. 
 
96 Id. 
97 Perez-Pena, supra note 83. 
98 Id. 
99 Walshe, supra note 83. 
100 Id. 
101 Id.  As the Governor signed the law he said: 
I’m proud to be a New Yorker, because New York is doing something, 
because we are fighting back, because, yes, we’ve had tragedies, and 
yes, we’ve had too many innocent people lose their lives, and yes, it's 
unfortunate that it took those tragedies to get us to this point, but let's at 
least learn from what’s happened, let’s at least be able to say to people, 
yes, we went through terrible situations, but we saw, we learned, we re-
sponded, and we acted, and we are doing something about it . . . .  We 
are not victims. 
Id. 
102 Id. 
103 See Osterweil, 999 N.E.2d at 519. 
104 See supra notes 83 and 94. 
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VI. THE RESIDENCY STANDARD THAT COULD HAVE BEEN 
APPLIED 
The State of New York and the district court were in agree-
ment that New York Penal Law § 400.00(3) had a domicile require-
ment up until the Second Circuit decision, when the State changed its 
position.105  Nonetheless, Osterweil, a part-time resident of New 
York, would not have been entitled to a handgun permit, even if the 
State did not change its position because he may not have been resid-
ing in the State for over 183 days.106  After the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals sent the certified question to the New York Court of Ap-
peals, the Court of Appeals held that § 400.00(3) did not have a dom-
icile requirement, and a part-time resident can obtain a handgun per-
mit, despite previously interpreting the statute to have a domicile 
requirement.107  The court should have expanded on this ruling.  Un-
fortunately, the one-dimensional ruling stands with no clarification of 
what constitutes a part-time resident. 
The New York Court of Appeals would not have had to labor 
to find a standard to determine what constitutes a part-time resident.  
The standard that should have been applied was readily available in 
the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance108 which 
had already established residency requirements for New York State 
nonresidents and part-year residents.109  The requirements for nonres-
idents paying taxes in New York could be applied to a part-time resi-
dent interested in obtaining a firearm permit. 
According to the Department of Taxation and Finance, non-
residents are subject to taxation in the State when certain conditions 
are met.110  When one is not domiciled in New York, certain condi-
tions will apply to determine whether a person is subject to taxa-
tion.111  One must maintain a permanent place of abode in the State 
“for substantially all of the taxable year.”112  Within that year, one 
 
105 Osterweil, 999 N.E.2d at 517; Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 85. 
106 Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 75. 
107 Osterweil, 999 N.E.2d at 520. 
108 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 105.20. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
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must spend in the aggregate more than 183 days in the State.113  
When these conditions are met, a nonresident is considered a resident 
of New York for taxation purposes.114 
This would be an appropriate standard because it outlines the 
connection a nonresident must have with the State in order to pay 
taxes.115  The residency standard from the Department of Taxation 
and Finance is suitable because the lives of people are closely tied to 
economics.  Furthermore, if these requirements were applied to a 
part-time resident seeking a handgun permit, cities, counties, the 
State, and the courts would benefit from the predictability of the 
standard. 
VII. DUE PROCESS AND INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides that, “no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of the law.”116  In order to determine 
whether there is a due process violation, the specific right that may 
have been violated needs to be identified.  In Osterweil, that specific 
right was Osterweil’s right to keep and bear arms.117  The Second 
Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right that 
was applied to the States by the McDonald Court in 2010.118  After 
determining the specific right, a court can apply a substantive due 
process analysis to determine whether the proposed standard violates 
a person’s fundamental right.119 
Since the right to bear arms was found to be a fundamental 
right by the Heller Court,120 one would assume that a strict scrutiny 
analysis would apply to a deprivation of a Second Amendment right.  
However, the district court in Osterweil was reluctant to deem this 
right worthy of a strict scrutiny analysis.121  Because the Heller Court 
never “announce[d] the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny” 
 
113 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 105.20. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
117 Osterweil, 999 N.E.2d at 517. 
118 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 806 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that the Second Amend-
ment applies to the States). 
119 Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 79. 
120 See supra note 75. 
121 Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 84. 
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for the right to bear arms122 and cautioned the lower courts on broadly 
interpreting its holding as to invalidate current firearms regulation—
the district court “[was] unpersuaded that strict scrutiny [was] war-
ranted.”123  Thus, the district court applied intermediate scrutiny to 
analyze Osterweil’s Second Amendment violation claim.124  With an 
intermediate scrutiny standard, the proposed residency standard used 
by the Department of Taxation and Finance would pass constitutional 
muster when applied to New York’s handgun permit process. 
In evaluating the proposed residency standard, the fundamen-
tal right should be identified as the right to keep and bear arms, or as 
the district court noted, “the right of a law abiding individual to keep 
and carry a firearm for the purpose of self defense in the home.”125  
To satisfy an intermediate level of scrutiny, a law must serve a state 
interest and there has to be “a reasonable fit between the objective 
and the law.”126  It is clear that the State has a public safety interest at 
hand.127  The State and its governmental subsidiaries must conduct 
background checks on eligible licensees.128  The State, including its 
governmental subsidiaries, will expend substantial resources in con-
ducting background checks on part-time residents.129  There is a rea-
sonable fit between the objective and the standard because a perma-
nent place of abode and the 183 day living requirement will give the 
State and its subsidiaries a narrower field of applicants for whom to 
conduct background checks.  With the 183 day living requirement, 
the State and its subsidiaries will have at least six months of a per-
son’s history as a basis for a background check. 
Assuming the court applied the proposed residency standard, 
Osterweil might not have been successful in obtaining his handgun 
permit.  First, he may have been considered a nonresident because he 
was domiciled in the State of Louisiana.130  Although he maintained a 
permanent place of abode in New York, which was once his domi-
 
122 Id. at 81. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 84-86. 
125 Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 84 (explaining that the burden imposed by New York 
Penal Law § 400.00(3)(a) falls one level below the core right described in Heller). 
126 Id. at 83. 
127 Id. at 85. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 84. 
130 Osterweil, 999 N.E.2d at 516. 
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cile,131 it is unclear whether he would have met the 183-day require-
ment because he only used his New York property as a vacation 
home.132  Therefore, he would have been denied a handgun permit, 
unless he could have shown that he was in New York, at his part-time 
residence, for at least 183 days.  Even though the application of this 
residency standard yields a contrary result to that of the court’s deci-
sion, the standard would pass constitutional muster under the inter-
mediate scrutiny standard.  This would not violate the Second 
Amendment because a person is being given proper due process. 
VIII. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
When government action is “arbitrary,” “conscience shock-
ing,” or “oppressive in a constitutional sense,” the government runs 
the risk of violating a person’s substantive due process rights.133  One 
must then show that the government “exercised power without any 
reasonable justification in pursuit of a legitimate governmental objec-
tive.”134  New York Penal Law § 400.00(3) deprives an individual of 
a fundamental right, and the proposed residency standard creates a 
hurdle for a person seeking a firearm permit.  However, there is a le-
gitimate governmental objective, which is public safety, but is the 
proposed residency standard a “gross abuse of governmental pow-
er?”135 
There is no “gross abuse of government power” because there 
exists reasonable justification to apply the proposed residency stand-
ard—because it helps state officials implement New York Penal Law 
§ 400.00.  Since § 400.00 requires a thorough background check and 
sufficient ties to the State, governmental officials are able to execute 
these processes appropriately to fulfill the legitimate governmental 
objective.136  Furthermore, acquiring a permanent place of abode and 
residing in the State for 183 days or more can be a viable option for a 
nonresident,137 as opposed to some states that completely ban nonres-
 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 88 (quoting Lowrance v. Achtyl, 20 F.3d 529, 537 (2d 
Cir. 1994)). 
134 Id. (quoting SeaAir NY, Inc. v. City of New York, 250 F.3d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 2001)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
135 Id. at 88 (quoting Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
136 See generally infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text. 
137 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 105.20. 
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idents from obtaining a handgun permit.138  Thus, there is nothing 
conscience shocking about restricting the right to bear arms to a part-
time resident because the proposed residency standard assists state 
officials in enforcing § 400.00, which is reasonably justified to fulfill 
a legitimate governmental objective. 
IX. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
A procedural due process violation occurs when one is de-
prived of a protected liberty or property interest without notice or op-
portunity to be heard.139  Clearly, Osterweil had a liberty interest in 
obtaining a handgun permit.  When applying the proposed residency 
standard, the State would not be violating procedural due process be-
cause in New York, a person can contest the denial of his or her 
handgun permit in an Article 78 proceeding.140  The Article 78 pro-
ceeding provides an adequate avenue for a person to contest the deni-
al of his or her handgun permit.141  Therefore, it is unlikely that the 
application of the proposed residency standard would violate due 
process. 
X. HOW THE PROPOSED RESIDENCY STANDARD HELPS NEW 
YORK 
New York has a public safety interest in monitoring those it 
gives handgun licenses to, as noted by the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Bach v. Pataki.142  In Bach, the plaintiff was a resident 
and domiciliary of Virginia who wanted to carry his pistol while vis-
iting his parents in upstate New York.143  The plaintiff wanted to car-
ry his pistol because he would have to travel through dimly lit roads 
in areas with high rates of violent crime.144  The court recognized 
“that New York’s interest in monitoring gun licensees is substantial 
and that New York’s restriction of licenses to residents and persons 
working primarily within the State is sufficiently related to this 
 
138 Osterweil, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 88. 
139 Id. at 89. 
140 See supra note 58 (explaining that there is a procedural mechanism in place to appeal 
the denial of the handgun permit). 
141 Id. 
142 408 F.3d 75, 91 (2d Cir. 2005). 
143 Id. at 76-77. 
144 Id. at 77. 
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[State] interest.”145 
New York has a substantial and legitimate interest in “ensur-
ing the safety of the general public from individuals who, by their 
conduct, have shown themselves to be lacking the essential tempera-
ment of character which should be present with one entrusted with a 
dangerous instrument.”146  In Bach, the court noted that New York 
has an interest in continually monitoring a person to obtain behavior-
al information with respect to the gun permit.147 
Without the proposed residency standard the State will have 
difficulty monitoring the behavioral information relevant to the non-
resident handgun permit applicant.  This would create a substantial 
burden on the State because it would have to cross into other jurisdic-
tions to obtain behavioral information about a nonresident appli-
cant.148  It would be costly and burdensome to run a background 
check on a nonresident. 
In addition, the nonresident does not have the same relation-
ship with the State that a citizen has.  When the State has a relation-
ship with its citizens, it is easier for the State to monitor the behavior 
of its handgun permit holders.149  Thus, the handgun licensing process 
is primarily left to cities and counties within the State.150 
It is evident that New York’s interest in gun control, more 
specifically its interest in monitoring the behavior of its handgun li-
censees, warrants the restriction of the right of a person, who is a 
nonresident, to keep and bear arms in the State.  If the State were to 
apply the residency standard proposed in this Case Note, individuals 
would be afforded the opportunity to obtain handgun permits in the 
State, so long as they maintained a permanent place of abode and re-
sided in the State for 183 days.  The 183 day requirement gives the 
State enough time to develop the significant relationship necessary to 
make the determination of whether a handgun permit should be given 
to a nonresident.   
 
145 Id. at 87 (holding that “the Privileges and Immunities Clause cannot preclude New 
York’s residency requirement in light of the State’s substantial interest in monitoring hand-
gun licensees”). 
146 Id. at 90 (quoting Pelose v. Cnty. Court of Westchester Cnty., 384 N.Y.S.2d 499 (App. 
Div. 2d Dep’t 1976)). 
147 Bach, 408 F.3d at 90. 
148 Id. at 92. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 79. 
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XI. CONCLUSION 
The New York Court of Appeals’ decision in Osterweil was 
inconsistent with the State’s interest in gun control.  The decision 
came exactly ten months after the State enacted the New York Safe 
Act.  This legislation served as an unequivocal statement by the State 
that it was serious about gun control.151  However, the court turned a 
blind eye to the message sent by the Legislature in its enactment of 
the Safe Act.  This is evident by the holding in Osterweil, which 
eliminated the domicile requirement from New York Penal Law § 
400.00.152  It is unclear why the court and the State changed their 
stance on New York Penal Law § 400.00, when Osterweil, a pro se 
litigant and lawyer, finally obtained the services of Greenbaum, 
Rowe, Smith & Davis to appeal the district court’s decision to the 
Second Circuit.153  Regardless of whether there was any pressure, the 
court could have remained consistent in the interpretation of the 
State’s interest by establishing a residency standard and defining a 
“part-time resident.”  If a residency standard had been established, it 
would have likely survived constitutional scrutiny.  It will be up to 
the State Legislature to establish a residency standard and define a 
“part-time resident.” 
Osterweil could not have argued that the statute completely 
banned his right to keep and bear arms if the proposed residency 
standard would have been adopted.  Although the precedents of Hel-
ler and McDonald solidified the Second Amendment as a fundamen-
tal right, the court still had some room to apply a residency standard.  
Absent an absolute ban on a part-time resident’s right to keep and 
bear arms, in applying a residency standard, the court would have es-
tablished a fair and balanced procedure.  By failing to elaborate on a 
residency standard, the court forfeited the opportunity to enhance the 
State’s interest in gun control. 
 
151 See Walshe, supra note 83. 
152 See Osterweil, 999 N.E.2d at 520. 
153 See Gregory, supra note 70.  “ ‘When Mr. Osterweil was pro se—we entered the case 
at the appellate level, when Mr. Osterweil was pro se—they were perfectly content to deny 
him his Second Amendment rights aggressively.  Once we entered the case, they started to 
rethink their position[.]’ ”  Id.  Attorney Schmutter also mentioned that the National Rifle 
Association supported Osterweil’s claim.  Id. 
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 I am a strong supporter of Second Amendment rights.  In this Case Note, I simply want to 
point out that the New York Court of Appeals could have denied a part-time resident a fire-
arm permit—when applying the New York Department of Taxation and Finance’s residency 
standard.  The proposed residency standard can survive an intermediate level of constitution-
al scrutiny, which was the standard that was used by the United States District Court, North-
ern District, New York in Osterweil.  Whether or not a strict level of constitutional scrutiny 
should be applied to evaluate a deprivation of Second Amendment rights is a topic for an-
other piece. 
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